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REPRESENTATIVES FROM POLISH
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Department of Forensics and Computer Forensics, Institute of Criminal Service
Police Academy in Szczytno
Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 111, Szczytno, Poland
p.olber@wspol.edu.pl

ABSTRACT
Dynamic development of IT technology poses new challenges related to the cross-border
collection of electronic evidence from the cloud. Many times investigators need to secure
data stored on foreign servers directly and then look for solutions on how to turn the
data into a legitimate source of evidence. To study the situation and propose solutions, I
conducted a survey among Polish representatives of public prosecutors’ offices and courts.
This paper presents information from digital evidence collection practices across multiple
jurisdictions. I stated that representatives from the prosecution and the judiciary in Poland
are aware of the issues associated with cross-border acquisition and preservation of cloudbased evidence. In their view, many of the problems are time-consuming and ineffective
international cooperation, the voluntary nature of cooperation between foreign cloud service
providers, lack of harmonized procedures and guidelines, the diversity of legal systems, and
the lack of knowledge held by law enforcement officials and the judiciary. This work should
be the beginning of an open discussion with practitioners about existing challenges and an
invitation for further research with a larger sample of prosecutors and judges. There are no
such studies in literature. The paper shows that it is possible to improve current procedures
for the cross-border collection of cloud-based digital evidence.
Keywords: digital evidence, computer forensics, digital investigation, international cooperation, cybercrime, cross-border investigation, jurisdiction, remote search.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Several years ago, Brenner & Schwerha (2002)
stated that the gathering of digital evidence
across national borders would be a challenge
© 2021 JDFSL

for law enforcement and judicial authorities
ahead. The authors did not strictly define
the duration of this challenge, stating only
that cross-border collection of digital evidence would be a problem for some time
Page 1
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(Brenner & Schwerha, 2002). Probably that
academics were not aware of how important
this problem would be ahead. Based on the
current state of digital evidence collection,
the statement by Brenner & Schwerha (2002)
has become prophetic. Gathering digital evidence causes frustration among cybercrime
detectives, prosecutors, and foreign affairs
ministers (James & Gladyshev, 2016). The
lack of a wide global legal framework for
the collection of digital evidence encourages
states to apply their own solutions. These
activities focus on overcoming existing jurisdictional barriers and do not always comply
with existing legal rules (Çela, 2015).The situation is like Polish police officers and representatives from prosecutors’ offices and the
judiciary.
My observations and experiences show that
in their actions are a lack of sufficient knowledge concerning cloud computing technology,
the technical possibilities of securing digital
evidence in the cloud, and legal regulations
in this area. Investigators secure data stored
on foreign servers directly. The law does not
permit access to such resources without international legal assistance. After acquired
data, investigators seek solutions on how to
turn the data into a legal source of evidence
(Opitek, 2018).
The described problem is essential because
law enforcement and justice should collect
digital evidence quickly and under the law.
However, this is a very complex issue because most times digital evidence is subject to multiple jurisdictions. Representatives of law enforcement and the judiciary
avoid talking about the difficulties that exist,
which makes it difficult to solve the problem.
The survey enabled the collection of information from representatives of prosecutors and
courts about their practice, a key element of
this study.
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1.1

Contribution

This work contributes importantly to the area
of law and computer forensics, the purpose to
provide digital evidence of crimes committed.
Specifically, this work provides information
relating to practices applied in acquiring and
preserving digital evidence by Polish prosecutors and the judiciary. Moreover, it points
out the changes in this area. The problem
of cross-border digital evidence collection is
worldwide (Cole & Quintel, 2018). This work
should be the beginning of an open discussion about existing challenges. Based on the
results of the research, representatives of the
prosecutor’s office should know that deputing
the police to secure data from foreign servers
as part of technical activities is unacceptable.
The results of the study should change the
current practice, which comprises ordering
the police to secure data from foreign servers.
Prosecutors should realize that collecting digital evidence requires using legal instruments.
To this, it is also important to take advantage of a 24/7 contact point. Readers can
use research results for train law enforcement
agencies and judicial authorities.

1.2

The current state of affairs

On the European level, it deals with these
issues of the Council of Europe and the European Union. These institutions were the
first to act to adapt existing legislation to
a changing world (Karatysz, 2014). These
bodies address issues related to cross-border
access to digital evidence and ways of securing it. The Council of Europe, which had already adopted the Convention on Cybercrime
(CETS No.185) in 2001, completed most of
the work. This institution established the
Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY)
("Details of Treaty No. 185 Convention on
Cybercrime," n.d.). The major task of the
T-CY Committee is to collect info on the
current legal situation in countries, propose
© 2021 JDFSL
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projects, conduct studies and publish reports.
T-CY Committee prepared two reports on
mutual legal assistance (T-CY assessment
report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 2014, Transborder access to data and
jurisdiction: Options for further action by
the T-CY, 2014). These documents have options for better proceeding on cross-border
access to digital evidence and jurisdiction.
These papers involve suggestions addressed
to the Parties of the Cybercrime Convention,
to increase international legal cooperation
and cross-border acquisition of electronic evidence, and also address jurisdiction.

1.3

Literature review

The literature review shows that the TCY Committee conducted a study on the actions taken by the Parties to improve the
cross-border acquisition of digital evidence
and focused on multi-jurisdictional legal assistance organizations. The research involved
40 States Parties to the Convention and 1
Observer State (Follow up to the Assessment Report on Mutual Legal Assistance–TCY(2013)17revCompilation of replies to the
questionnaire, 2017). Jõgi, Kaldoja, Luuk &
Randma (2018) analyze these studies, stressing that no single common approach for the
cross-border collection of digital evidence.
States are developing their own internal solutions. James & Gladyshev (2016) conducted
similar studies only on mutual legal assistance. Osula & Zoetekouw (2017) compare
distinct notification requirements for remote
search and seizure only in three countries.
Previous research showed not any comprehensive scientific study with the results of a
diagnostic survey on cross-border collecting
of digital evidence with various legal instruments and other solutions, based on the skill
and practice of law enforcement and the judiciary.
© 2021 JDFSL

Recent studies have shown that crossborder digital evidence gathering is relating to cloud computing. Carthy, Crosbie,
Kechadi & Ruan (2011) define this term as
a paradigm with complex aspects. The complexity of the cloud is because of its structure,
which comprises many resources: networks,
servers, storage, applications and services.
Data centers are also located all over the
world. This means that data replication takes
place in many locations and in distinct jurisdictions. All these make cloud computing
a problem for law enforcement and the judiciary and hamper the collection of digital
evidence. Hurst et al. (2014) list 65 major
forensic challenges which include architecture, data collection, analysis, anti-forensics,
incident first responders, role management,
legal issues, standards and training. Scientists studied these areas over the past years.
However, many challenges remain unresolved.
I present the results of the research conducted
so far related to the problem of collecting electronic evidence from clouds in the following
paragraphs.
Dharaskar, Patil & Thakare (2017) identify
the lack of a specific framework for computer
forensics at distinct levels of cloud computing
services such as Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). This is also what
Erlin, Lizarti & Sudyana (2019) point out
when investigating a server in the private
cloud. The situation is further complicated
by private enterprise clouds (Wang & Wang,
2012). The case is even more problematic for
public cloud computing services where CSP
plays a leading role. Service providers have
control over the data and all the information.
Investigators depend on CSPs if they need
digital evidence, including network and server
logs (Ali, Memon, Sahito, 2018). It is therefore essential to develop cloud-based forensic
tools and solutions that will reduce depenPage 3
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dence on CSP (Choo, Conti, Gaur, Manral
& Somani, 2020).
To minimize the difficulties with collecting
digital evidence from the clouds, many researchers pay attention to the possibilities offered by traditional computer forensics. Dargahi & Dehghantanha (2017) discovered that
the local device contains forensic data relating to CloudMe and 360Yunpan accounts.
The authors show that user credentials, device names, filenames, and evidence of activity are on hard drives, in volatile memory,
and backup files. Data are also in the memory of mobile devices (Horng, Huang, Ko,
Wang & Zhuang, 2021). Investigating an iOS
device, the authors revealed artifacts related
to OneDrive, Dropbox and Google Drive.
According to Horsman (2020), data related
to cloud services read from the memory of
devices can justify a request sent to a CSP.
By analyzing the devices connected to the
cloud, investigators can collect user data and
information about files stored in the cloud
(Ahmad, Ariffin, Hamid & Shahidan, 2020).
Web browsers save many artifacts. By examining the suspect’s hard drive and the contents of RAM, investigators can get potential
digital evidence (Carpenter, Hill, Montasari
& Montaseri, 2019). Such possibilities exist
even with encrypted communication (Choo,
Dehghantanha & Teing, 2018). The authors
examined the CloudMe application and recovered the root directory of the web application from the web browser cache. Choo,
Dehghantanha, & Mohtasebi (2017) investigated SpiderOak, JustCloud and pCloud
services. They recovered e-mail addresses,
the ID and name of the account, and the
names of uploaded and downloaded files.
The second group of solutions uses various
models and procedures. It’s also relating to
CSPs. According to Gritzalis, Kalloniatis,
Katos & Simou (2019), cloud services should
consider specific forensic requirements. This
will allow for gathering evidence according to
Page 4

forensic principles. Another idea is to minimize law enforcement dependency on CSPs.
Alex & Kishore (2017) proposed a centralized
forensic server with a layer called the Forensic
Monitoring Plane (FMP). Trenwith & Venter (2019) proposed a system for managing
access to cloud facilities. Their solution uses
the location of objects and an access control mechanism called the digital passport
(FReadyPass). Other than the technical issues, the authors emphasize the complexity
of legislative and jurisdictional issues.
The analysis of research shows that the
key problem in collecting digital evidence
from the clouds is a legal issue. Many experts highlight the challenges of multiple jurisdictions (Mohiddin, Sharmila & Yalavarthi,
2017). It’s difficult to coordinate multiple jurisdictions (Ghosh & Majumder, 2021). This
affects the investigation and delay in data
access (Arora, Sakthivel & Sharma, 2018).
Multiple jurisdictions means many laws, regulations, and agreements. This complexity
means that sometimes a digital investigation
ends up violating local law (Albakri et al.,
2018). According to Conti, Dargahi & Dehghantanha (2017), the analysis of legal implications related to conducting forensic analysis
in the could increase the possibilities of using
cloud investigation techniques. Brown (2015)
argues, however, that governments around
the world show a reluctance to analyze the
effectiveness of mechanisms for investigating
serious cases of cybercrime.
Perhaps the solution should be to implement a universal law that would apply and
would be subject to only one jurisdiction
(Ajayi, 2016). However, the mere existence
of legislation is not sufficient. Close regional
and global cooperation is essential, also with
internet service providers (Bërdufi & Dushi,
2017). The authors point out that, apart
from jurisdictional issues, the awareness and
knowledge of law enforcement authorities is
also important. Based on his research, he con© 2021 JDFSL
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cludes that most law enforcement agencies
do not have the technical knowledge, while
internet criminals are experts in computer
technology. One strategy to combat these
crimes is to educate and develop human resources.
Mohammed & Mohammed, (2019) state
that it is a widespread agreement among practitioners and researchers that cybercrime investigation hampers by insufficient knowledge
and skills gaps in law enforcement and judiciary. The authors argue that as the amount
and importance of digital evidence increases,
judges must fairly assess them. They must
have a general comprehension of the technologies. According to the authors, it’s necessary to build awareness among lawmakers
and law enforcement officers. Mahanamahewa & Perera (2017) shows that the lack
of adequate support and regulations make it
difficult for digital forensics experts to prepare and present acceptable evidence to the
courts. This situation leads to delays in resolving cases.
According to Seger (2013), the efficient response of criminal justice is essential. Capacity building is fundamental as an approach
to cybercrime. Elements of capacity building programs may include support for legislation, training, and cooperation. These
programs should aim to increase the power of
law enforcement. The tangible effects of this
approach will improve the use of electronic
evidence in criminal proceedings. Karie &
Karume (2017) pointed out that many law
enforcement agencies around the world are
introducing proactive measures to increase
their ability to respond to security incidents.
They also create an environment known as
digital forensic readiness.
Digital forensic readiness also produces
many challenges. One of them is the lack
of qualified digital forensics personnel. Staff
training and compliance with a forensic readiness plan, however, can be an efficient mea© 2021 JDFSL

sure. All staff members in the organization
will know the correct procedures during the
digital investigation process. Previous studies have almost only focused on digital forensic, models, jurisdiction, and building forensic competence and readiness. However, the
source of data in these studies was not the
knowledge and experience of representatives
of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.
The only exception is Barrett’s study (2017).
She determined the possibilities to apply traditional forensic evidence gathering processes
in cloud computing.
A scientist conducted a more recent study.
Barrett (2020) got the judge of 14 experts on
evidence gathering in the cloud environment
and suggestions on how to prepare students
for technological changes in data acquisition
processes in the digital environment. Despite
these studies, the problem of cross-border
collection of digital evidence remains open.
Therefore, the research question asked in this
paper is stated as follows: What are the problems and difficulties faced by police officers,
prosecutors, and the judiciary regarding actions taken to acquire and secure digital evidence from the cloud? This issue needs clarification by asking the more detailed questions:
• Is it possible to improve the current procedures for cross-border evidence collection from cloud computing, and what
actions should be taken?
• Do police officers, prosecutors, and
the judiciary have adequate knowledge
about legal regulations concerning the
access to digital evidence from the cloud?
• Why do police officers, prosecutors, and
the judiciary use different legal bases
regarding digital evidence collection?
• How do police officers, prosecutors, and
the judiciary evaluate cooperate with
foreign cloud service providers?
Page 5
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• What does the cooperation with the 24/7
contact point established by the Cybercrime Convention look like?

2. SURVEY
CONSTRUCTION,
VALIDATION AND
PRETESTING
To get answers to the above questions, I organized a survey. Before the survey, I conducted
a detailed literary analysis of the acquisition
and preservation of digital evidence. The
questionnaire contains 25 questions divided
into the following four categories:
Practical-related questions: In this set
of questions, the respondents provided information about their experience in secure electronic evidence in the cloud (Q1), used methods of proceeding (Q2), identified of problems
(Q3), other known problems (Q4) and proposed solutions to the identified difficulties
(Q5). I present the results in Appendix 1.
Cloud Service Provider-related questions: In this set of questions, the respondents were required to give information about
their experience in cooperation with foreign
cloud service providers (Q6), used regulations
to send data access requests (Q7), opinion
about needs improvement in this cooperation
(Q8), known problems (Q9) and proposed
solutions to the identified problems (Q10). I
present the results in Appendix 2.
24/7 contact point-related questions:
In this set of questions, the respondents provided information about their experience in
cooperation with a 24/7 contact point (Q11),
the scope of cooperation (Q12), elements that
need to improvement (Q13), known problems
(14) and proposed solutions to the identified
difficulties (Q15). I present the results in
Appendix 3.
Opinion and knowledge-related questions: In this set of questions, the responPage 6

dents provided information about their knowledge of international activities to improve the
procedures for acquiring digital evidence from
the clouds (Q16, Q17), participation in training on cloud computing or cross-border collection of digital evidence (Q18-Q20) and knowledge of legislation (Q21 – Q25). I present the
results in Appendix 4.
To test the reliability and accuracy of
the questionnaire, I conducted a pilot study
among 40 court representatives who took part
in the cybercrime training in Police Academy
in Szczytno, Poland (https://www.kssip.
gov.pl/node/5805). After collecting the
questionnaires, I discussed all comments and
observations with the participants. Then
I checked the answers and additional comments. This approach allowed for the final
refinement of the questionnaire by making
the selected questions more detailed. After
this piloting process, the questionnaire was
ready for the larger audience. The questionnaire is available at (Olber, 2019).

2.1

Population and sampling

The criterion for selecting the sample for the
research was professional affiliation, and the
activities performed. Because of the specific
nature of the research issues, I assumed the
target group would be computer forensic experts from Polish police forensic laboratories
and specialists from the Bureau/Departments
for Combating Cybercrime, as well as representatives from prosecutors’ offices and the
judiciary. However, I did not receive permission to conduct opinion polls within the
police. I conducted research in the end of
2018 exclusively among representatives from
Polish prosecutors’ offices and the judiciary.
The survey involved 142 respondents. However, I distributed the questionnaires to 243
people. One theory to explain the low number of responses may be respondents’ desire
to avoid admitting to insufficient knowledge
© 2021 JDFSL
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of digital evidence regarding its acquisition
and preservation.

2.2

Data collection

I conducted the survey in November 2018.
I distributed the survey to participants of
trainings organized by the National School
of Judiciary and Public Prosecution in Cracow, Poland (https://www.kssip.gov.pl/
angielski).

2.3

Data validation and
analysis

I checked all the surveys received for completeness. I found that, among the collected
questionnaires, 3 had missing data in closed
questions and discarded them. One questionnaire did not include a sign of gender (metric).
Here, the sum of observations is 138 and in
the other questions 139.

2.4

Statistical tests

I conducted a statistical analysis of the survey
results using IBM SPSS Statistics. I recorded
the results of the survey as cross-tabulations.
Then, I compared the responses of the prosecution and court employees and checked all
the correlations. I categorized the responses
for the open-ended questions. I analyzed the
categories similar to the closed questions. In
the analysis, I used the following test and
statistical coefficient to examine the relationships: I used the Chi-square test to see the
relationship between nominal variables or between nominal and ordinal variables. N values determine the size of the study set.
For all statistical tests, the level of significance was set to P = 0.05. I used Cramer’s V
coefficient to test how strong the correlation
is between the nominal variables or between
the nominal, ordinal variable. I calculated
Cramer’s V statistic when the Chi-square test
produced a significant result, under the condition of group independence and the num© 2021 JDFSL

ber of expected observations. This value can
range from 0 to 1. The higher the value,
the stronger the correlation between the variables. In the study, I adopted the numerical
intervals: |0,0 – 0,2| – very weak relationship;
|0,2 – 0,4| – weak relationship; |0,4 – 0,6| –
moderate dependence; |0,6 – 0,8| – strong
dependence; |0,8 – 1,0| – very strong dependence.

3.

RESULTS

This section summarizes the survey results
and starts by presenting the characteristics
of the respondents.

3.1

Demographics

Two groups of respondents took part in the
study, prosecution representatives N = 57
and judicial representatives N = 81. More
than half of the surveyed representatives from
prosecutors’ offices (64.9%, N = 37) and representatives from the courts (64.2%, N = 89)
are women. Men were the other 35.1%, N
= 20 of the surveyed representatives from
prosecutors’ offices and 35.8%, N = 29 of
the surveyed court employees. I present the
results of demographics in Table 1.

3.2

General questions

This section addresses questions according to
the division presented in section Survey construction. The following questions will allow
to identify the level of knowledge and awareness and the prosecution and judiciary’s standard practices relating to the cross-border
collection of digital evidence, including from
cloud-based services.
3.2.1

Practical-related questions

The research shows that only one in four prosecutorial employees, and so 24.1%, N = 14
and only 3.7%, N = 3 of court staff faced the
need to secure cross-border digital evidence
in the cloud. Prosecutorial respondents most
Page 7
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Table 1. Group of respondents

often pointed to a legal decision to request
data and search of an IT system – 4.9%, N =
4. The other answers given by the prosecution were: the use of mutual legal assistance
(2.5%, N = 2), appointing an IT expert (1.2%,
N = 1), and get a username and password
and the self-directed login to the resources
(1.2%, N = 1). Court representatives (individuals), pointed to the legal decision to
request data, the appointment of an expert,
and the order for expert examination. The
research shows that many more prosecutorial
employees (48.3%, N = 28) than court employees (28.4%, N = 51) believe that getting
digital evidence from foreign cloud servers is
a problem for law enforcement authorities. In
contrast, far more court employees (66.7%, N
= 79) than prosecutorial employees (43.1%, N
= 54) have no knowledge or opinion about the
subject. According to the respondents, the
problems in preserving and acquiring digital
evidence are: - ineffective international cooperation, and the voluntary nature of cooperation with foreign service providers (11.5%
each, N = 16); - lack of standard procedures
and guidelines (98.6%, N=12); - diversity of
legal systems, lack of knowledge, location of
servers outside the country, location of cloud
service providers outside the country, lack of
software and technical solutions, distinct data
retention time, anti-forensic solutions, and
identification of the offender (mentioned by
maximum 6 people). Prosecutorial employees
Page 8

most often see the problem of the voluntary
nature of cooperation with foreign cloud service providers (15.5%, N = 9), and court
employees most frequently see the problem of
time-consuming and ineffective international
cooperation (11.1%, N = 9). Regarding the
problems presented by the respondents, it is
important to pay attention to the solutions
proposed by them. Respondents most often
pointed to develop effective legal regulations
(7.2%, N = 10), and less often to the train
of law enforcement and judicial authorities
(5%, N = 7), improvement of international
cooperation (3.6%, N = 5) and development
of procedures and guidelines (3.6%, N = 5).
Maximum 2 persons choose the remaining
methods, such as increasing the financial budget, the obligation for foreign cloud service
providers to cooperate, and unification of legal systems. It is interesting to note that only
prosecutors’ staff (8.6%, N = 5) proposed improving international cooperation.
3.2.2

Cloud Service Provider-related
questions

The research shows that many more prosecutorial employees (29.3%, N = 17) than court
employees (7.4%, N = 6) have applied to a
foreign cloud service provider to acquire digital evidence. To send data access requests
to foreign cloud service providers responders
most often used Mutual Legal Assistance
(7.9%, N = 11) and less frequently to the
© 2021 JDFSL
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European Investigation Order (5.8%, N =
8). The answers also included national legislation (3.6%, N = 5), informal cooperation
(2.2%, N = 3) and the Cybercrime Convention (0.7%, N = 1). Many more prosecutorial
employees (37.9%, N = 22) than court employees (18.5%, N = 15) believe that cooperation between Polish procedural authorities
and foreign cloud service providers needs improvement. The similar percentage of prosecutorial employees (5.2%, N = 3) and court
employees (4.9%, N = 4) have a different
opinion. The respondents questioned about
specific problems regarding cooperation with
foreign cloud service providers most pointed
to the time-consuming nature of cooperation
(10.1%, N = 14), and less to the voluntary
nature of cooperation with foreign cloud service providers (5.8%, N = 8) and the lack
of regulations concerning direct cooperation
with such providers (5.8%, N = 8). Maximum 3 respondents each mentioned the other
problems, such as the diversity of legal systems, language differences, diversity of data
retention time, ignorance of foreign legal regulations, and lack of standard procedures and
guidelines.
Respondents queried about proposed solutions to problems related to the Polish authorities’ cooperation with foreign cloud service
providers most often pointed to (3.6% each,
N = 5) the obligation on foreign cloud service providers to respond, develop effective
legal regulations and use the assistance of a
24/7 contact point, and slightly less (2.9%,
N = 4) to improve international cooperation.
Maximum 2 people gave the remaining answers, such as effective use of existing legal
instruments, training of law enforcement authorities and the judiciary, unification of data
requests, and unification of data retention
time.

© 2021 JDFSL

3.2.3

24/7 contact point-related
questions

Only a few prosecutorial staff (8.6%, N = 5)
and court staff (1.2%, N = 1) cooperated with
the 24/7 contact point. This cooperation involved primarily technical consulting (2.9%,
N = 4). Prosecutorial employees (8.9%, N
= 5) and court employees (3.7%, N = 3) believe that needs to improve this cooperation.
Many court employees (92.6%, N = 75) and
prosecutorial employees (82.1%, N = 82.1)
had no opinion (and/or knowledge) on this
subject. Respondents queried about aspects
requiring improved pointed to the need of
dissemination of information on the principles of cooperation (2.9%, N = 4) and need
to prepare training courses (0.7% – only one
person). The same responders proposed solutions and pointed, that it is necessary to
disseminate information on the principles of
cooperation and ongoing exchange of information with the 24/7 contact point.
3.2.4

Opinion and knowledge-related
questions

Only a few respondents, namely 3.4%, N = 2
from the prosecution and 1.3%, N = 1 from
courts are familiar with international activities related to the improvement of procedures
for obtaining digital evidence in the cloud.
They listed initiatives: the build of a platform
for exchanging the European Investigation
Order in electronic form (one prosecutor) and
the European Investigation Order (one court
employee). The survey participants were not
aware of this. I should note that none of the
respondents mentioned the work carried out
by the Council of Europe, in particular the
TC-Y Committee and the Cloud Evidence
Group, which are important for cross-border
gathering of digital evidence. More respondents working in prosecutors’ offices (10.3%,
N = 6) than in the court (3.7%, N = 3) took
part in training covering the issues of crossPage 9
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border acquisition of digital evidence. Most
of them took part in training in preventing
and combating cybercrime (5%, N = 7).
More court employees (33.3%, N = 27)
than prosecutorial employees (22.4%, N =
13) wrongly believe that the Polish police
have procedural rights to remotely search IT
resources and acquire digital evidence in this
manner. Contrary opinions (which are correct) expressed by far more prosecutorial staff
(19%, N = 11) than by court staff (3.7%, N
= 3). More prosecutorial employees (51.7%,
N = 30) than court employees (32.1%, N =
26) believe that it is legal to search the content of an e-mail inbox, available via a web
browser operated by a foreign operator. Less
than 10% of the respondents gave (in the
author’s opinion) the correct answer. Many
more court staff (58%, N = 47) than prosecutors (41.4%, N = 24) do not have this
knowledge. According to the respondents,
the search of e-mail sources should do with
visual examination (32.4%, N = 45), and
less (22.2%, N = 31) by the search of an IT
system.
Fewer respondents chose the remaining answers, forensic expertise (6.5%, N = 9), procedural control (2.2%, N = 3), and experimental reconstruction (0.7%, N = 1). Asked
which element most determines the legality
of getting digital cloud-based evidence, the
respondents most pointed to the crime scene
(28.8%, N = 40). Nearly the same (28.1%, N
= 39) admitted to a lack of knowledge. Many
believed it is the location of the headquarters of the service provider (15.8%, N = 22)
or the location of stored data (13.7%, N =
19). The other answers were: the location
of the person who owns or controls the data
(9.4%, N = 13), the location of the offender
(8.6%, N = 12), the location of the service
provider (6.5%, N = 9), the location of the
victim (6.5%, N = 9), and the location of the
service provider’s representative (5.0%, N =
7).
Page 10

Analyzing the answers, we should note that
with serious crimes, we may consider two options: the crime scene and the place where the
effect of the offense. Responders asked about
a basis for remote searches or other means
of acquiring data located outside the country
most often admitted to lack of knowledge
(45.3%, N = 63). The two most frequently
pointed out concrete answers were: when
data are publicly available and makes up an
open-source of information (22.3%, N = 31)
and after obtaining the consent of a person
allowed to disclose IT data (19.4%, N = 27)
– both correct. Many wrongly believed that
a remote search or other methods of remote
access to data outside the country is possible
where the search concerns a service provider
operating in a country that has ratified the
Cybercrime Convention (CETS) (15.8%, N
= 22), inability to identify a service provider
(10.8%, N = 15) and the procedural control
(10.1%, N = 14). The smallest number of
respondents indicated a lack of knowledge
about data location (5.8%, N = 8) and a lack
of certainty about data location (5.8%, N =
8).
3.2.5

Statistical coefficient

As a result of the statistical analysis, I found
significant relationships between variables in
the following survey questions: Q1 - Q6, Q8,
Q9, Q11, Q21, Q24. The obtained values
of the significance level limits for these questions, lead me to accept the hypotheses: Prosecutors had a stronger need to secure
cloud-based digital evidence than the judiciary. - When it is necessary to secure evidence in the cloud, only prosecutors use a
search of the computer system. - Prosecutorial employees are much more convinced
that getting digital evidence from cloud computing is a problem. - More prosecutorial
employees than of the courts perceive a problem with the diversity of legal systems. Only prosecution staff believe that the so© 2021 JDFSL

JDFSL 2021
lution to cloud evidence collecting problems
lies in improving international cooperation. Significantly more prosecutors submitted an
application to get electronic evidence from
a foreign cloud service provider than court
representatives. - Prosecutorial employees
are much more likely than court employees
that cooperation between law enforcement
authorities and service providers needs to improve. - Significantly more prosecutorial employees than of the courts note the problem
of the lack of procedural regulations regarding direct cooperation with foreign service
providers. - More employees of the prosecutorial employees than of the courts worked
with a 24/7 point of contact. - Significantly
more employees of the prosecutorial employees than of the courts have a good knowledge of procedural rights regarding remote
searches of IT resources. - Representatives
of prosecutors and courts have no knowledge
or opinion about the competence of national
law enforcement and justice agencies to get
electronic evidence from clouds. I should emphasize that the statistical significance found
is not the same as the actual significance. The
above statements should be interpreted as a
basis for further consideration and inquiry.
3.2.6

Lack of knowledge in international cooperation and cloud computing technology.
3. Polish representatives from the prosecution and the judiciary do not fully use
the potential of the 24/7 contact point
for international cooperation and collect
digital evidence. The 24/7 contact point
does not promote its own role among
national authorities.
4. Representatives of the prosecution and
the judiciary in Poland do not have a
uniform approach to collecting of digital evidence from clouds. They secure
digital evidence as part of various procedural activities (examination, a search of
an IT system, procedural experiment).
5. It is possible to improve current procedures for the cross-border collection of
cloud-based digital evidence. It requires
full using existing legal instruments, using the 24/7 contact point, providing
training in international cooperation and
cloud computing, and developing and implementing mechanisms to monitor the
effectiveness of the international partnership.

Summary of the survey

This section summarizes the survey findings.
1. Representatives from public prosecutors’
offices and the judiciary in Poland are
aware of problems related to the crossborder collection of digital cloud-based
evidence. However, they are not sure
about the correct approach and the legal
basis.
2. The problem in digital cloud-based evidence acquisition is the lack of service
providers’ willingness to cooperate. The
deficit of adequate equipment for national law enforcement authorities with
tools enabling to acquire digital evidence.
© 2021 JDFSL

4.

WEAKNESSES

During the analysis of the problem of crossborder collecting of cloud-based digital evidence, I encountered difficulties because of
the lack of literature on this topic. It led
to analyzing existing legal regulations and
reports from the Council of Europe and the
European Union. Another problem included
developing questionnaires of one type for various groups of respondents: representatives
from courts and prosecutors’ offices, and police computer forensic experts and specialists
in cybercrime, although the police did not
take part in the study. The following limitation was the lengthy procedure for obtaining
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permission to conduct research among police officers, which was unsuccessful because
of a lack of consent from senior police officials. The other limitation was that some
participants did not complete the questionnaires. This may have resulted from a desire
to avoid admitting to insufficient knowledge
of digital evidence regarding its acquisition
and preservation.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

The paper concludes by arguing that representatives from the prosecution and the
judiciary in Poland are aware of the issues
associated with cross-border acquisition and
preservation of cloud-based evidence. According to the respondents, the main problems are
time-consuming and ineffective international
cooperation, the voluntary nature of cooperation between foreign cloud service providers,
lack of harmonized procedures and guidelines,
the diversity of legal systems, and the lack of
knowledge held by law enforcement officials
and the judiciary.
Representatives from the prosecution and
judiciary in Poland do not have sufficient
knowledge (which, according to the respondents, is also a problem) about legal provisions regulating the cross-border acquisition
of digital evidence. The respondents show
that lack of knowledge in international cooperation and cloud computing technology is
a major issue. Knowledge of the solutions
and possibilities for digital evidence collection, and cloud computing technology itself,
is essential. It is important to understand
that the clouds use a virtualization mechanism and different models of services with
specific features. Foreign entities with data
centers located around the world offer these
services. This raises many concerns about the
possibility of independent access to resources
by law enforcement representatives.
Page 12

Lack of knowledge of the proper methods
of proceeding and the legal basis of digital
evidence acquisition causes Polish representatives from prosecutors’ offices and the judiciary to commission the police to secure data
on foreign servers. The police carry these
tasks out within the framework of various
process activities, most often the search of an
IT system. However, legal regulations do not
allow for the direct exploration of such data.
Most representatives from prosecutors’ offices
and courts in Poland are not aware of the circumstances that may justify a remote search
or other ways of obtaining remote access to
data stored beyond national borders. This
lack of awareness is because of unfamiliarity
with the Cybercrime Convention. The Convention provides two possibilities to access
digital data without the consent of the other
country: publicly available data, and getting
legally effective, voluntary consent from the
person allowed to disclose such data.
A significant number of representatives
from the prosecution and judiciary believe
the Polish police have procedural powers in
remote search of IT resources and the acquisition of digital evidence. However, Polish legislators have never passed laws enabling remote
search of IT systems. Police officers should
not conduct such activities. It is also wrong
to believe that searching the contents of an
e-mail inbox, owned by a foreign operator,
complies with applicable legal regulations.
Issues in cross-border acquisition of digital
evidence from clouds results from uncertain
cooperation with service providers, which is
often lengthy and ineffective. The voluntary,
variable and unreliable nature of this cooperation is also a problem. The service provider
has a final decision on the disclosure of the
data.
Polish law does not regulate direct cooperation between law enforcement authorities
and foreign cloud service providers. There
is also a lack of legal tools obligating foreign
© 2021 JDFSL
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cloud service providers to transfer data in
the framework of foreign direct cooperation.
Representatives from the Polish judiciary and
prosecutors’ offices do not use the full potential of the 24/7 contact point established
by the Cybercrime Bureau of the Polish National Police Headquarters. The 24/7 contact
point does not promote itself among national
authorities. There is the potential to take
action at national and international levels
to improve current procedures by which to
acquire electronic cloud-based evidence.

5.1

Future work

Future research should aim to replicate the
results on a larger sample of prosecutors and
the judiciary. There is also a need to conduct a survey among police computer forensic
experts and specialists in cybercrime. This
will identify the genuine issues involved in
collecting digital evidence subject to foreign
jurisdiction.
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Appendices

Table 3. Appendix 2. Cloud Service Providerrelated questions.

For interested readers a detailed survey results are presented in the Appendices: 1–
4.
Table 2. Appendix 1. Practical-related questions.

Table 4. Appendix 3. 24/7 contact pointrelated questions.
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Table 5.
Appendix 4.
Opinion and
knowledge-related questions.
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